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his paper argues that development aid 
could be greatly improved if the 
management of development programs and 
projects could be governed by an effective 
orientation to cost-effectiveness. This in turn 
could substantially be achieved by changes the 
paper proposes to aid evaluation—through a 
particular kind of association—and a few lesser 
management reforms. During the 60 years of 
development assistance, evaluation has largely 
been controlled by donor and implementing 
agencies. When it comes to the evaluation of 
their own programs, however, these agencies 
face profoundly mixed incentives. Moreover, 
due to the particular needs for learning and 
accountability in this field, the demands placed 
on evaluation in development aid are 
uncommonly great. When we think about how 
development interventions should be evaluated, 
we often start from the perspective of an 
individual program or project or from that of a 
single donor or implementing agency. This, I 
argue, is a mistake. We should approach aid 
evaluation from the perspective of the 
development assistance community as a whole. 
Given that the challenges of development are 
common challenges, both in the sense of being 
similar for different agencies and in the sense of 
arising from shared goals, we should look for 
evaluation approaches that best support the 
development community overall. 
 We can gain some insight into the current 
situation in aid evaluation by considering a 
typical low-income country with 20 
development programs and projects in 
agriculture. Half to two thirds of these projects 
have some kind of evaluation. However the 
evaluation framework is worked out 
independently for each project, and the 
evaluators have a great diversity of academic 
training and practical experience. Evaluation 
criteria and approaches are inconsistent, and 
only one or two of the evaluations make 
reference to evaluations of other agricultural 
projects. Also, officials of the very agencies that 
funded and managed the projects select the 
evaluators. Since a negative evaluation is likely 
to hurt the professional and organizational 
interests of the evaluation commissioners, the 
evaluators suspect that they will be better off if 
they give positive findings. Few of the projects 
have serious monitoring systems, and it would 
be hard to estimate impacts. Except where 
things are really bad the evaluators report 
positive and negative findings regarding process 
and outcomes and partial achievement of goals. 
They conclude that overall the project was 
satisfactory. 
 This basic scenario, with minor variations, is 
played out repeatedly in most sectors of most 
low-income countries that have significant aid 
operations. How would this scenario change if 
the association this paper proposes were 
established? In this new scenario too probably 
about two thirds of the 20 projects would be 
evaluated, but here all twelve or thirteen 
evaluations would be based on common criteria 
of cost-effectiveness. The evaluators would 
T
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know evaluation, they would know the literature 
on approaches to the agricultural challenges 
facing the country, and they would share 
common conventions for estimating each 
project’s total impacts and cost-effectiveness. 
They would be familiar with several evaluations 
of similar projects in this and other countries, 
and their assessments would be explicitly 
comparative, identifying the merits of the 
evaluated projects relative to other actual 
and/or possible projects. The shared 
conventions for estimating project impacts 
would not only render the estimates technically 
sound – they would also protect the evaluators, 
and hence the evaluations, from actual or 
perceived pressure for positive bias, as 
significant violations could lead to loss of 
membership in the association. Each evaluation 
would explain how the project’s impacts (of 
low, medium or high cost-effectiveness) were 
achieved, beginning with an assessment of the 
project plan, and they would identify areas of 
particular strength or weakness in project design 
and management. Compared to today’s 
evaluations, their analyses of project dynamics 
would be (on average) both deeper and more 
reliable, providing a sounder basis for learning 
and for accountability. Moreover, their 
recommendations would be better informed 
and more helpful. 
 If this scenario could be borne out, it would 
require those planning and managing projects to 
adopt an orientation to cost-effectiveness and it 
would support them in doing so. By reading 
evaluations and evaluation syntheses, managers 
would gain an integrated perspective on the 
factors that contribute to greater cost-
effectiveness in their sector, and now they 
would have a stronger incentive to apply these 
lessons. This would lead to a reduction in major 
design errors, the establishment of better 
monitoring systems, and more rapid mid-course 
corrections in project designs. Better designs 
and design features would more rapidly be 
identified and replicated, and professional 
recognition and advancement would come to be 
based more significantly on contributions to 
impacts. After a substantial initial investment 
routine evaluation costs might rise by perhaps 
50% compared to today, but it is reasonable to 
expect gains in impacts to greatly outweigh 
increased costs. 
 To substantiate this argument, the paper 
proceeds as follows. The next section discusses 
the great challenges of learning and 
accountability in foreign aid and how the 
incentive environment under which evaluation 
has evolved has undermined evaluation’s 
contribution to aid management. The third 
section lays out the design of the proposed 
association and discusses how it might operate, 
and the fourth section discusses its likely 
impacts. The fifth section deals with what it 
would take to establish the association, and the 
sixth section concludes. 
 
Challenges of Learning and 
Accountability in Aid and 
Incentives Influencing Aid 
Evaluation 
 
It is important to appreciate the unusual burden 
that evaluation bears in development aid. 
Compared to the tasks most organizations 
undertake, improving economic and social 
conditions in developing countries is particularly 
difficult. Standards of efficiency and 
effectiveness in public and private institutions in 
these countries tend to be low and working 
conditions difficult. Access to aid resources is 
carefully cultivated, and aid programs become 
enmeshed in political agendas and personal 
enmities. For most programs to succeed many 
people have to undertake new responsibilities 
and carry them out well, and coordination and 
logistics are typically quite demanding. Most 
development agencies work in many countries, 
but a strategy that works in one place may not 
work well in another. The history of 
development assistance is less one of building 
on and refining strengths than one of sequential 
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fads, with the new one displacing the former 
after it is found inadequate. We only hope that 
today’s poverty reduction strategy papers and 
sector-wide approaches will not follow the 
pattern of state-led industrialization in the 
1960s, integrated rural development in the 
1970s, structural adjustment in the 1980s, and 
decentralization in the 1990s. 
 Development assistance routinely sets 
idealists to planning programs to be carried out 
by other people in a country that is not their 
own. Also, like evaluators, development 
planners and managers come with a remarkable 
variety of academic and professional 
backgrounds and ideological commitments. The 
competition for resources requires them to act 
as policy entrepreneurs, promoting the positive 
merits of the approach their program takes. All 
too often, however, the hard realities on the 
ground do not yield to planners’ and managers’ 
ideals. 
 For most organizations in other fields, even 
if the leaders’ initial ideas are misguided, 
operational experience forces them to adapt to 
clients’ needs and desires. In the private sector 
this works through the market mechanism 
based on customers’ willingness to pay. For 
most organizations in the public sector, at least 
in a democracy like the United States, there are 
multiple channels through the political process 
for clients to express their views. Especially 
when services get really bad, representative 
governments are likely to hear about and to 
address the problem. For development agencies, 
however, it is a constituency in the home 
country that allocates resources that are later 
spent thousands of miles away. The intended 
clients have no role in the process. To sustain 
the flow of resources it is the home 
constituency that the development manager has 
to satisfy, but when a program is failing its 
clients have no recourse. 
 For all of these reasons, the challenge of 
learning to identify program designs and 
management strategies that are more likely to 
succeed in a given development context is 
particularly great. At the same time, 
development planners and managers are less 
likely to be held accountable for the 
consequences of their choices than 
professionals in most arenas. We have already 
noted that development aid lacks the structural 
accountability of the market or the electorate. In 
addition, the consequences of management 
choices normally play out over periods of many 
years, and many other factors besides the 
project are sure to influence client conditions. 
Within the standard organizational framework 
of development management, the only way 
project results would normally come to be 
known is through evaluations.  
 Unfortunately, however, it is the very donor 
and implementing agencies that evaluations are 
supposed to assess that have controlled the 
evaluation process. Insofar as new funding 
depends on likely results, donor and 
implementing agencies have an incentive to 
make their impacts appear positive. Yet they 
organize the evaluations that provide the main 
evidence of their impacts. There are two ways 
that the evaluation process could be 
manipulated: by introducing or encouraging 
positive bias in evaluations, or by basing 
evaluations on less rigorous criteria than 
expected impacts and cost-effectiveness. For 
example, evaluations based on how a project 
carries out its main tasks (process) or on how it 
achieves its objectives (outcomes) often reach 
more positive findings than evaluations based 
on impacts and cost-effectiveness. 
 As prevailing incentives would lead us to 
expect, evaluation standards in international 
development aid have indeed been mixed and 
generally unsatisfactory. In fact for several 
decades the leading development agencies, first 
the US Agency for International Development 
(USAID) and then the World Bank, did evaluate 
many of their projects in terms of economic 
rates of return (ERRs), a measure of cost-
effectiveness. However they never developed 
institutional means to render ERR estimates 
consistent between projects, and they are 
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increasingly moving to other evaluation 
approaches (e.g., Kusek & Rist, 2004). 
Development agencies generally have not made 
consistency between evaluations (in their 
evaluative judgments) a priority, and the 
selection of evaluators, particularly for the key 
end-of-project evaluations, has usually been 
decentralized. 
 There is only limited direct evidence of 
positive bias in aid evaluations. This author 
found overwhelming positive bias in evaluations 
from a blind selection of four World Bank and 
four USAID projects in Africa (Clements, 
1999), and many authors have remarked on the 
gap between evaluation averages that are always 
positive and country-level trends of economic 
stagnation or decline. There is more consensus, 
however, on the poor quality of typical aid 
evaluations. For example, Robert Piccioto, a 
former Director-General of Evaluation at the 
World Bank, asserts that the record of 
international evaluation has been “dismal” 
(Bollen, et al., 2005, p. 190). Chianca finds that 
only about a quarter of US-based international 
nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) have 
developed evaluation policies and standards and 
less than 10% subject their evaluations to 
metaevaluations or carry out any regular 
synthesis of evaluation findings (2007, p. 129). 
In a study of over two dozen evaluations of 
USAID democracy and governance programs, 
Bollen et al. find “a lack of methodological 
accuracy and inappropriate coverage of 
important information about the impact of 
assistance interventions” (2005, p. 199). They 
conclude that their assessment: 
 
…appears to match the assessments of other 
researchers who have reviewed the evaluations 
of interventions by other international 
development agencies. The typical evaluation 
lacks an appropriate research design, measures 
of inputs and outputs, and controls for 
confounding variables to justify sound 
assessments of whether an intervention 
accomplished its goals (ibid., p. 202). 
A review of World Bank agricultural 
projects in Africa from 1991 through 2006 
similarly finds that: 
 
M&E [monitoring and evaluation] at the project 
level has been of limited value in answering 
fundamental questions about outcome, impact, 
and efficiency, such as who benefited, which 
crops received support and how, what has been 
the comparative cost effectiveness, and to what 
can one attribute gains (World Bank, 2007, p. 
xxviii). 
 
While there are many excellent individual 
evaluations, most professionals who deal 
regularly with aid evaluation would probably 
agree that the general standard is inconsistent 
and often poor. 
 In light of the organization of aid evaluation 
and the incentives bearing on its conduct, it 
would be surprising if standards were much 
higher. Compared to the situation in earlier 
decades, today’s development assistance 
community is more aware of the need to 
improve evaluation. Reforms to date, however, 
have been piecemeal. None has addressed the 
basic incentive structure or provided a means to 
achieve consistency between evaluations, the 
qualifications of evaluators remain extremely 
diverse, and the proportion of evaluations that 
estimate cost-effectiveness is probably 
declining. Unless these problems are addressed, 
however, the potential contribution of 
evaluation to accountability and to learning 





To reiterate, evaluations would do much more 
to serve the unusually great need for learning 
and accountability in the international 
development community if they routinely 
estimated the impacts and cost-effectiveness of 
the subject program or project in terms of 
criteria and on the basis of judgments that were 
technically sound and also consistent between 
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evaluations. This could be achieved in the same 
manner that accounts and audits for public 
corporations have been rendered (in most cases) 
technically sound, independent, and consistent: 
through the establishment of an association that 
controls entry to the profession and sets and 
enforces the standards. For the sake of 
discussion, let’s call it Evaluation International 
(EI). 
 Evaluation International would address the 
problem of positive bias by establishing a 
general evaluation approach and principles and 
conventions for implementing it. The approach 
would be to estimate the impacts and cost-
effectiveness of each program or project under 
evaluation and to explain how they were 
reached. It is essential that these should be 
estimated because impacts and cost-
effectiveness provide the uniquely appropriate 
basis for learning and accountability in the 
international development community. The 
development community should do the best it 
can to improve conditions for poor people, and 
this means using its resources as cost-effectively 
as possible. All other criteria with the exception 
of serious ethical violations should be channeled 
through the prism of cost-effectiveness. 
 In this conception, impacts are understood 
as total changes in conditions of “impactees” 
compared to the conditions one would expect if 
the intervention had not taken place. When a 
project was begun with an evaluation system 
involving an experimental or quasi-experimental 
design, estimation of the counterfactual up to 
the time of the evaluation may be relatively 
straightforward. For most interventions, 
however, impact estimates involve an (implicit 
or explicit) reasoned assessment of the likely 
counterfactual. Also, total impacts attributable 
to a program typically include many that have 
not yet taken place, but estimates of future 
impacts are particularly difficult. Impacts 
include all changes in conditions attributable to 
an intervention, for intended beneficiaries and 
for others, that are relevant to any stakeholder. 
They may include improvements in income and 
health, social capital, education and/or 
empowerment, as well as any harms (negative 
impacts) an intervention may have caused. In 
most cases the estimation of impacts is not 
merely a matter of calculation, but also one of 
reasoned assessment of evidence. Once all 
impacts have been estimated and costs tabulated 
the assessment of cost-effectiveness is a 
straightforward mathematical operation. 
Establishing principles and conventions for all 
of these assessments is a major part of 
establishing EI. 
While cost-effectiveness orients the 
methodology, the EI approach would also 
incorporate standard principles of good 
evaluation practice, as expressed, for example, 
in Scriven’s Key Evaluation Checklist.1 
Conventions are needed in particular for 
estimating future impacts in evaluations at 
project completion. They would indicate how 
different kinds of evidence, such as of 
institutional strengths and weakness, should be 
factored into impact estimates. Once the 
approach, principles, and conventions are 
worked out, the problem of positive bias is 
addressed by requiring adherence to them in 
order to retain membership in the association. 
This allows an evaluator to defend herself, in 
case she feels pressured to over-state a project’s 
impacts, by noting the principle or convention 
that she is required to apply. 
 To implement this model, EI would need a 
guidebook to lay out its approach, principles 
and conventions, an examination to establish 
basic mastery (and hence admission to the 
association), and a standards committee to judge 
adherence. Presumably these three core 
components and their basic operations would 
be worked out in tandem. It would be 
reasonable to begin with a focus on three or 
four sectors, such as agricultural extension, 
primary health care, water, and microfinance. 
Then the association could use evaluations in 
these sectors to work out its conventions. As 








well as the guidebook, EI would also establish 
an online, indexed archive of evaluations with 
commentary on their strong and weak points. 
Each completed evaluation by a member of the 
association would be added to the archive, and 
the archive would be open to the development 
community at large. The archive would not only 
illustrate the application of the guidebook; it 
would also help managers to learn from one 
another’s experience. Someone starting a new 
water project, for example, might consult 
evaluations of similar completed projects 
including some that were cost-effective and 
others with limited impacts. 
 When EI awards membership it would give 
each newly certified evaluator an EI stamp. 
When an evaluator stamps an evaluation she has 
completed, this indicates that in her professional 
judgment it is consistent with the EI approach, 
principles and conventions. The evaluator is 
obliged to make her best estimate of the 
evaluated program or project’s likely total 
impacts and cost-effectiveness. Of course many 
interventions do not conduct baseline surveys 
or develop reliable monitoring systems, so there 
may be limited bases for estimating impacts at 
their completion. After conducting an 
appropriate survey and exploring exogenous 
influences on client conditions, the evaluator 
may only be able to estimate impacts quite 
roughly. Besides information from the project, 
however, she normally will also know 
evaluations of several similar projects and their 
estimated impacts and cost-effectiveness. These 
evaluations may indicate how characteristics of 
the project and its implementation are likely to 
contribute to impacts. The evaluator’s task is to 
locate the present project within the range of 
evaluated projects based on its likely cost-
effectiveness (loosely, impacts minus costs all 
adjusted for time). Supposing there are five 
cost-effectiveness categories (e.g. very low, low, 
medium, high and very high), she may well be 
able to exclude three of the categories as clearly 
inapplicable, and indicate the single category she 
considers most likely. She should note the 
evidence that supports her estimate and the 
plausible conditions which, if inconsistent with 
her own implied model of project dynamics, 
would lead to a different conclusion. 
 Initially the standards committee should 
review all evaluations completed by members of 
EI. Even if at first the guidebook focuses only 
on three or four sectors, it is sure to miss 
important dilemmas facing evaluators in these 
areas and to provide guidance that is sometimes 
off the mark. Also the lines between serious and 
trivial violations of its principles and 
conventions may be hard to draw, and they will 
inevitably contain shades of gray. Normally no 
competent member of EI who makes a good 
faith effort to apply the EI approach should 
have reason to fear expulsion. The threat of 
expulsion is to ensure that EI evaluations are 
adequately designed to address the evaluation 
questions a project poses and to guard against 
major errors in impact estimates, particularly 
those that could represent bias. A member 
could only be expelled by a majority vote of the 
standards committee after she has had the 
chance to defend herself. The EI stamp, then, 
will be a signal that an evaluation has a credible 
design, that it is informed by relevant 
knowledge and experience from other projects, 
that it offers a defensible estimate of impacts 
and cost-effectiveness within an appropriate 
range, and that it gives a credible account of the 
causes of project impacts based on available 
information about the intervention’s design and 
management. The guidebook’s principles and 
conventions and guidance for their application 
will be improved over time. 
 
Evaluation International’s 
Contributions to Learning and to 
Accountability 
 
Development professionals should be held 
accountable for learning from experience, and 
EI provides the analytic material for both the 
accountability and the learning. First, all EI 
Paul Clements 




evaluations estimate the intervention’s impacts 
and cost-effectiveness. Second, because impact 
estimates are based on consistent conventions 
they provide a basis for cross-project 
comparisons. Third, each evaluation explains 
how project results, whether favorable or 
unfavorable, were achieved. Hence EI 
evaluations will provide something the 
development community heretofore has lacked: 
a basis for identifying more cost-effective 
approaches to improving economic and social 
conditions in developing countries. Initially 
impact comparisons will be most reliable within 
sectors, but as conventions for estimating 
impacts are improved, cross-sector comparisons 
will also be supported. Also, fourth, EI 
evaluators will be familiar with the literature on 
the sector and with other evaluations of similar 
interventions. In due course their judgments 
and explanations will reflect the cumulative 
experience of the development community. 
 Most immediately, therefore, EI evaluations 
will be more analytically rigorous and will give 
better informed conclusions and 
recommendations. This will increase the 
contributions from evaluation to “local” 
learning, as evaluation findings inform ongoing 
program management. For donor agencies and 
the development community at large, EI will 
also support the identification of more cost-
effective program designs and design features. 
With his famous 1980 paper, David Korten 
popularized the idea of a “learning process 
approach” for development agencies, and many 
international nonprofits subsequently came to 
describe themselves as learning organizations.2 
These agencies have largely depended, however, 
on their own in-house program review 
processes (often with external evaluations as 
material). EI will set the stage for a better 
informed learning process within individual 
agencies and across the development 
community. 
                                                
2 David C. Korten, 1980, “Community Organization and 
Rural Development: A Learning Process Approach,” 
Public Administration Review.  
 Note that the analytic move from impacts 
to cost-effectiveness involves factoring in costs 
in a way that is consistent between evaluations. 
By committing to have EI conduct its 
evaluation, therefore, a development agency will 
give its staff an incentive to look for cost 
savings and for cases where high quality inputs, 
even if costly, can contribute to substantially 
greater impacts. As more evaluations are 
completed, there will be new opportunities to 
assess the merits of different management 
approaches and other design features. It will be 
possible to assess, for example, how more 
participatory approaches or approaches that 
make greater use of advanced technologies tend 
to affect a project’s cost-effectiveness. Since the 
archive will be indexed, this will facilitate 
exploring such questions with statistical studies 
based on large numbers of projects as well as 
with more nuanced and qualitative multi-case 
comparisons. 
 Initially EI evaluations should focus on 
relatively discrete interventions, such as most 
development projects, where the intervention is 
the largest single factor influencing changes in 
the relevant conditions of the beneficiary 
population. All development interventions 
should aim to maximize cost-effectiveness given 
the appropriate conception of impacts and 
frame of reference (e.g. including qualitative 
impacts, and a wider frame for highly 
experimental projects). However when the 
variation in the relevant conditions caused by 
other factors exceeds the variations due to the 
project, such as with most structural adjustment 
programs and many sector-wide programs, and 
when causal connections between the 
intervention and changes in conditions are 
particularly hazy, it is harder to make reliable 
impact estimates. Evaluators must of necessity 
focus on intermediate variables of questionable 
significance, and expert judgment (which may 
not be reliable) often has to play a larger role. 
We can expect that through the operation of EI, 
the boundary of program types for which 
impacts can reliably be estimated will gradually 
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be extended. There are some kinds of programs, 
however, such as short term executive 
education programs, which will continue to 
resist evaluation on the basis of their impacts. 
 There are three main ways in which 
establishing EI is likely to enhance 
accountability. First, development planners can 
be held accountable for applying the lessons of 
experience in their program and project designs. 
Although the development community has been 
carrying out projects for more than 60 years, 
many planners are familiar with only a tiny slice 
of this experience and many projects are 
launched with weak designs. Besides estimating 
cost-effectiveness, EI evaluations will routinely 
explain how impacts unfold from project design 
and implementation. When cost-effectiveness is 
low, the evaluation will explain how far this is 
attributable to the project design. Heretofore 
donor agencies have tended to reward efficiency 
in committing funds or “moving money,” 
(Tendler, 1975; World Bank, 1992; Clements, 
1993, p. 1634, pp. 1639-1642; Nelson, 1995; 
Clements, 1996; Horta, 2006, p. 9, Svensson 
2006, p. 121), but once information on the 
contribution of project designs to impacts is 
available, it would be surprising if donor 
agencies failed to use it in personnel evaluations.  
 Second, project managers can be held 
accountable for modifying the project design in 
a timely manner in light of its unfolding 
experience. My own experience reviewing 
projects and their evaluations suggests that 
significant gains could be realized through more 
timely mid-course corrections. Probably the 
majority of project designs turn out to require 
substantial modifications, and evidence of 
mistaken assumptions or unrecognized 
constraints is often available quite early in a 
project’s lifetime (see e.g., Clements, 1999, p. 
1376). Significant design changes, however, 
often involve changes in a project’s 
management structure, with implications for 
budget allocations and for personnel. Approvals 
may be needed from project principals in donor 
agencies and in the host country government. 
While the learning that EI stimulates will help 
managers to identify when design changes are 
needed, anticipating an EI evaluation at project 
completion will also alter managers’ incentives. 
It will be apparent, at the evaluation, when 
evidence of a significant flaw in the project 
design became available. EI will provide a basis 
for holding managers accountable for taking 
such information into account. 
 Third, due to their greater rigor and 
independence, EI evaluations will uncover more 
of those (relatively few) instances of significant 
corruption. Large scale corruption inevitably has 
programmatic consequences, and evaluators 
accustomed to a cost-benefit framework will be 
sensitive to inconsistencies in project 
documents and curious when costs appear 
disproportionately high. Estimating project 
impacts requires the evaluator to look rigorously 
forward to likely project results, and this leads 
to a similarly rigorous investigation backwards 
into their causes. Many of today’s evaluations 
are relatively superficial and pay little attention 
to costs, and many evaluators are unfamiliar 
with procedures for initiating criminal 
investigations. EI evaluators, however, will be 
prepared to inform the appropriate authorities 
when they encounter evidence of fraud, so 
when EI is first established the number of 
prosecutions is likely to rise. After some time 
this will raise the perceived costs of engaging in 






Three pieces must be in place for EI to be 
established: evaluators to found it, donors and 
possibly implementing agencies to use its 
services, and resources to cover its start-up 
costs. A group presumably made up largely of 
evaluators will need to write the guidebook, 
develop and organize the examination, establish 
the standards committee, initiate the archive, 
and work out EI’s operating procedures. Before 
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the evaluators can proceed very far it seems that 
several donor agencies will need to commit to 
retain them for sections of their portfolios. The 
founding donors and evaluators together should 
select the sectors for the guidebook’s initial 
focus and arrange for evaluations of a defined 
part of the donors’ operations in these sectors 
to be carried out by EI members. As suggested 
above, the sectors might include agricultural 
extension, primary health care, water and 
microfinance. To protect EI’s independence it 
would be better if its startup costs were not be 
covered by the founding donors. Perhaps 
private foundations or governments through the 
United Nations could cover these costs. EI can 
be expected to enhance the development 
community’s professionalism and cost-
effectiveness and hence speed achievement of 
the Millennium Development Goals and other 
reductions in world poverty, so it would be a 
reasonable investment. 
 Ideally EI’s members will be drawn from 
across the countries that are donors and 
recipients of aid. The first priority, however, is 
to establish the competence of the association’s 
membership. Since the depth and competence 
of the evaluation profession varies significantly 
across countries EI’s initial membership may be 
skewed in its national representation, but every 
effort should be made to include wide 
participation from developing countries. In the 
long run sources of members will depend on 
how training and testing are carried out; these 
should be organized to secure balanced 
representation. 
 Assuming EI’s appropriate establishment 
and its members’ competence, we can expect EI 
evaluations on average to be technically superior 
to those of any donor agency today. What a 
donor gives up in control by joining EI it will 
gain in credibility and effectiveness. The launch 
of EI will be more robust if its initial members 
include a distribution of bilateral and 
multilateral donor agencies. While EI’s donor 
members should be represented on its 
governing board, to defend EI’s independence, 
and in order that EI can promote the vitality 
and integrity of the evaluation profession, a 
majority of its board should be evaluators. 
 One task for EI’s donor members will be to 
establish a scheme for valuing impacts that they 
can collectively support. Recall that each EI 
evaluation estimates project impacts and cost-
effectiveness. Impacts are typically measured in 
units based on the kind of impact, but cost-
effectiveness is measured in monetary terms. In 
order to compare projects with different kinds 
of impacts in terms of their cost-effectiveness, it 
is necessary to establish the value of each kind 
of impact on a common scale. This should not 
be thought of in terms of the inherent value of 
the impact (e.g. the value of a life saved, the 
value of a person having adequate access to 
clean water), but rather as how much donors are 
willing to pay to achieve a particular impact 
(Clements, 1995). Traditional economic cost-
benefit analyses have assessed impacts in terms 
of their economic values at market prices or 
based on some notion of beneficiaries’ 
willingness to pay, but these scales tend to 
neglect part of the value of non-economic 
impacts and they lead to implicit biases in favor 
of beneficiaries who are less poor. For EI 
evaluators to make consistent estimates of the 
cost-effectiveness of different kinds of projects 
they need to know how much value to assign to 
a given quantity of each kind of impact. Since it 
is donors who allocate funds to projects, it falls 
to them to specify how much the impacts are 
worth to them. It would enhance the evaluation 
community’s unity and efficiency if the donors 
could agree on a single scale of values. 
 EI will clearly need quite a few seasoned 
evaluators among its founding members. As 
noted above, first they and the donor members 
need to select the initial sectors on which EI 
will focus. To write the guidebook they should 
consult texts on cost-benefit analysis and review 
a number of evaluation reports from the 
selected sectors. The guidelines, principles and 
conventions for estimating impacts should be 
worked out both deductively and inductively. 
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The deductive approach starts from the relevant 
impacts and one works out how they can best 
be estimated. The inductive approach starts 
from examples of stronger and weaker 
evaluations and one works out the principles 
(etc.) that are implicit in the former and the 
mistakes to be avoided from the latter. The two 
approaches should be combined especially for 
working out conventions for estimating 
impacts. 
 The founding evaluators will also need to 
establish reading lists for each sector. They 
should consult with sector specialists, but 
several of the evaluators should also read or re-
read the texts. They should aim for a minimal 
list that provides an adequate basis for mastery 
of the dynamics of the sector. The examination 
to establish qualifications for entry to the 
association might include optional sections 
associated with each sector. In order for the 
association to build its character and 
organizational culture, the founding evaluators 
will need to establish a shared body of 
knowledge and sufficient agreement in 
judgments. Much of the latter may be worked 
out in formulating the entrance examination and 
particularly the principles and guidelines to 
govern operations of the standards committee. 
 The standards committee anchors the 
association’s principles and hence its 
independence. The founders should determine 
the kinds of technical knowledge to be found 
among the committee’s members, and selection 
procedures should ensure that these areas are 
covered. It is essential, however, that the 
committee should always possess the 
confidence of a majority of members. Hence its 
chairperson and two vice-chairs should be 
elected by the evaluator members, perhaps for 
terms of three years, and with some recall 
procedure. 
 The founding members can also build their 
foundation of common principles by 
commenting on evaluation reports to be 
included in the archive. The indexing system for 
the archive is mainly a technical matter, 
although members should be encouraged to 
recommend terms for the index. The archive 
should be conceived, however, as representing a 
body of the evaluator members’ professional 
judgments. As part of establishing the 
association the founding members should 
discuss the merits of a selection of evaluations, 
perhaps in an online forum. After completing 
the discussion the selected evaluations and their 




It should not be imagined that EI is opposed to 
methodological diversity in evaluation or that all 
EI evaluators should be alike. The EI approach 
to estimating impacts and cost-effectiveness 
should serve as grounds for a core analytic 
consistency among EI evaluations, but once this 
is established it is appropriate and desirable for 
diversity in methods and in areas of excellence 
to flourish among the association’s members. 
This paper aims to suggest a few aspects of how 
EI might be established in order to clarify the 
basic proposal. In the actual event other issues 
are likely to be found more important and 
unanticipated constraints may undermine the 
relevance of some of these ideas. The basic 
proposition is that consistency in technically 
sound estimates of impacts and cost-
effectiveness should provide a new foundation 
for professionalism in development 
management. The details of how this is 
achieved are less important. 
 Even though EI evaluations have 
characteristics of public goods, once EI is 
established its recurring costs should be borne 
by the users of its services. Evaluator members 
might pay membership dues which they recover 
in their evaluation fees and/or donors might 
contract for sets of evaluations with the 
association. Also donor members might pay 
subscriptions to sustain the archive. 
 The need for EI derives largely from the 
structural situation in which donor and 
implementing agencies, governments, and 
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powerful interest groups inevitably have the 
main influences on the organization of aid. The 
taxpayers and contributors who provide the 
resources for aid and aid’s intended 
beneficiaries in developing countries, by 
contrast, have little power to defend and 
promote their interests. In this context it is 
appropriate to view evaluators as defending the 
interests of the poor by developing and 
adhering to high technical standards in 
estimating program and project impacts and 
cost-effectiveness. Strong evaluation in some 
measure “corrects for” the disempowered status 
of aid’s intended beneficiaries. 
 Of course evaluation by itself cannot 
complete the loop of learning and 
accountability. It will be up to other members 
of the development community, especially 
officials of donor and implementing agencies, to 
use evaluation findings in their personnel 
management. Once managers are rewarded for 
effective management and penalized for failing 
to maintain professional standards, however, 
this will alter the incentive environment for 
development professionals generally. Given 
stronger incentives and better materials for 
learning, development professionals will tend to 
make more cost-effective choices, and 
development resources will be better used to 
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